It now suddenly seems much more important to examine the situational, personal and socialisation conditions responsible for these inconsistent definitions of costs and benefits. If one assumes that things are useful for one person that may be useless or even costly for the other, the decisive question that arises in the search for causes of action is what costs and benefits are actually for whom. The subsequent attempt to expand the concept of utility to include non-financial, social and psychological aspects seems meaningful at first glance, but ultimately ends in a theoretical conception without any explanatory content. This is what a cost-benefit analysis of crime might look like (see: Becker, 1968: 201) However, the rational choice theory in its basic conception does not manage to explain crime beyond economic motives, because there is obviously much more than money for which (delinquent) action is worthwhile. However, the theory of rational choice seems to make sense above all in the field of white-collar crime, since it is able to present the cost-benefit calculations carried out in managerial and executive circles in favour of deviant actions as the origin of criminal machinations. The classical вЂњmanslaughterвЂќ can hardly be justified with вЂњrational choiceвЂќ. In the case of a theory that deals with the rationality of human beings, the first thing that certainly catches the eye is the lack of explanatory power for emotional, affective and impulsive actions. It is thus closely linked to deterrence theories and вЂ“ due to its close relationship to the Routine Activity Approach вЂ“ to the concept of situational crime prevention. Thirdly, the rational choice theory calls for a deterrent criminal law. Secondly, access to criminal activity must be blocked in order to limit the decision-making situation from the outset to conforming alternatives. In concrete terms, this means, firstly, that incentives for legal behaviour must be created. more rational for the individual, to prefer conformist action to criminal action. Society, the state and its criminal law must therefore be conceived in such a manner that it is more benefit-maximizing, i.e. Since the theory of rational choice is based on the assumption of individual benefit maximisation, the task of criminal policy is to reward conformal behaviour in such a way and at the same time punish criminal behaviour in such a way that the former becomes more rational for the individual. People can thus be prepared in principle to commit crimes due to a high personal benefit expectation, but are still subject to situational factors (police presence, size of the loot, location of the possible crime) prior to the concrete action, among which they must again actively decide for the actual criminal act.

Accordingly, the probability of a delinquent act increases if the benefits of such an act outweigh the costs вЂ“ for example, if the loot is estimated to be greater than the danger of being caught.ДЄccording to Cornish and Clarke, a distinction must also be made between general and situational decisions on criminal behaviour. In criminology, this model of вЂrational choiceвЂ™, which is generally based on action theory but is also implied in the classical school, was used to explain the phenomenon of crime or deviation. The pros and cons of an action are calculated and a decision is made for or against the action. Since Rational Choice Theory is a general theory of action, benefits and costs are not limited to financial or other economic factors, but may also imply psychological or social benefits and costs. Thus, the greater the personal benefit and the lower the personal cost of an action, the more likely it is to be committed. In general, this economic as well as social science approach states that all action is conditioned by goals, desires and needs as well as by the human attempt to realize these goals to the greatest possible extent. The thesis of вЂRational ChoiceвЂ™ is an economic, general theory of action. Becker, Derek Cornish, Ronald Clarke, u.a.

Cost of rational rose